The Network of Democracy Research Institutes (NDRI) is an association of institutions that conduct research on democracy, democratization, and related topics in comparative government and international affairs. The Network includes independent institutions and university-based study centers, as well as research programs and NGOs devoted to the study of democracy and human rights. To fulfill its mission of linking democracy research institutes across the world into a global network, the NDRI holds international conferences and regularly disseminates information to its members.
Introduction
On April 26-28, the global Network of Democracy Research Institutes (NDRI) convened a conference on "Poverty, Inequality, and Democracy" in Bratislava, Slovakia. The meeting was consponsored by three member institutes of the NDRI-the Washingtonbased International Forum for Democratic Studies (IFDS) of the National Endowment for Democracy, Slovakia's Institute for Public Affairs (IVO), and Stanford University's Center for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL)-and made possible by financial support from the United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF). The conference agenda and a list of the participants appear in the Appendix. Four papers presented at the conference will be published in the October 2009 issue of the Journal of Democracy.
The conference was opened by Grigorij Mesežnikov, president of IVO, who underscored the importance of studying how poverty and inequality impede democratization and how democracy, while a good in its own right, could also be instrumental in tackling social and economic ills, especially in the context of the challenges posed by the worldwide economic recession.
Next, Marc F. Plattner, director of the IFDS, discussed the increasing relevance of the relation between democracy and social policy. He noted that, in recent years, numerous scholars have called for more attention to be paid to these issues and to how they might be more effectively addressed by democrats, especially amidst the rise of populist movements in South America led by politicians with questionable democratic credentials. Plattner then explained that the conference stems from current efforts by the IFDS to examine how the so-called social agenda affects democratic development. These efforts have included a meeting in Washington in September 2007, a workshop on social policy at the World Movement for Democracy's Fifth Assembly, Poverty, Inequality, and Democracy Bratislava, April 26-28, 2009 "Making Democracy Work: From Principles to Performance," held on April 6-9, 2008, in Kyiv, Ukraine, and the publication of a cluster of four articles on the topic in the October 2008 issue of the Journal of Democracy.
Finally, Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, deputy director for research and senior research scholar at CDDRL, highlighted the exigency of the questions the conference sought to answer.
What follows is a brief report of the most relevant issues addressed by the paper presenters, commentators, and participants.
Theorizing Poverty, Inequality, and Democracy
Opening the conference's first session, Professor Nancy Bermeo presented a paper examining the nature of inequality and its relation to democracy. Focusing on the period between 1990 and 2005, Bermeo observed that, although the number of democracies rose dramatically and economic growth accelerated at a rapid pace, economic inequality remained constant or even increased in some cases. Taking this disjunction as her starting point, Bermeo attempted to explain it and explore its implications.
Bermeo dealt first with some conceptual matters pertaining to the definitions of inequality and poverty. She defined inequality as the condition of having different, and therefore unequal, command of resources valuable for well-being. From an empirical point of view, one cannot define inequality without a modifier-political inequality, gender inequality, economic inequality, and so on. Democratization diminishes political inequality by creating an even field for all citizens, but it does not directly affect the private realm of family or the market. Poverty, on the other hand, refers to levels of income that are inadequate for well-being, or (as theorized by Amartya Sen) to deficits in capability that derive from an insufficiency of economic means. Thus, economic inequality is a matter of the distribution of economic resources that arises when economic units are ranked according to the wealth they earn or possess. Whereas inequality exists on a gradient, poverty is intrinsically dyadic, dividing the population between poor and non-poor. As two distinct phenomena, economic inequality and poverty are not necessarily correlative.
Having made this clarification, Bermeo asked if democracy diminishes inequality. Democracy presumptively leads to a demand for greater economic equality, and many scholars indeed think of democracy as a "game of redistribution." Yet as measured by Gini coefficients, income inequality in the majority of democracies has either remained constant or increased.
Reversing the question, Bermeo asked if economic inequality affects the quality of democracy. The harmful effects of inequality could hypothetically include a disproportionate influence of the wealthy, political detachment on the part of a large sector of the population, support for populism, support for personalist rule, corruption, and low levels of accountability. While cautioning about the reliability and comparability of some data, Bermeo reported a strong negative correlation between income inequality and measures of voice and accountabilityevidence of the threat that inequality poses to the quality of democracy.
Third, Bermeo investigated whether democracies are at risk, and concluded that economic inequality by itself will not be a cause of democracy's collapse since the breakdown of democracy requires "coup coalitions"-critical masses of counter-elites who have the capacity to topple regimes. Coup coalitions are not easy or likely to form for a number of reasons. For one, international actors have raised the cost of coups. Also, wealthy classes that once backed coups have come to believe that they have more power in an electoral democracy than in an authoritarian regime. In addition, democracy enjoys powerful appeal across regions, in many cases offering opportunities for radical change that are less risky than seizures of power. So, in spite of its deleterious effects, inequality does not pose an imminent risk for democracies.
Comparing Social Policies
While Bermeo's paper emphasized the relationship between inequality and democracy, the paper by Professors Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman focused primarily on the different strategies that new democracies have employed in dealing with poverty and other social welfare issues. They noted that there are two principal kinds of strategies that states have pursued. The first emphasizes universal policies of social assistance, while the second seeks to target assistance more narrowly to make sure that it benefits the poor.
Comparing the experience of Central and Eastern Europe with that of Latin America, Haggard and Kaufman examined the effects of democratization on social policy. Democracy generates electoral incentives for politicians to compete by advocating redistribution and expanded welfare commitments. It also guarantees freedom for previously excluded groups to organize. To ascertain the actual impact of democratization, however, one has to pay close attention to the authoritarian legacy in each of these regions. The effects of authoritarianism linger, conditioning the characteristics of present-day democracies. Critical realignments and political coalitions produced distinctive authoritarian models, which, in turn, created constituencies that influenced the course of social policy in new democracies.
In Latin America, for example, the reform coalitions that pushed and implemented the transition from oligarchic rule that took place from 1910 to about 1950 were comprised not only of labor unions, but also of dissident factions of the oligarchy. These cross-class reform coalitions excluded rural peasants and unorganized urban workers, perpetuating their political marginalization. While post-war importsubstitution industrialization (ISI) strategies accommodated welfare entitlements for the organized urban working class, they largely failed to address the impoverishment of these politically excluded classes. In short, these political realignments and ISI strategies resulted in a highly skewed welfare system that benefited the middle class and upper echelons of the blue-collar working class.
In Central and Eastern Europe, where the authoritarian legacy is that of communism, critical alignments in the transition to communist rule repressed all other parties and tightly controlled labor. Statesocialist welfare systems were founded on a social contract that produced a fundamentally different social welfare trajectory. Communist development in Central and Eastern Europe was characterized by central planning, including manpower planning and effective employment guarantees; nationalization that led to state provision of social insurance and services, particularly pensions and health insurance but also family allowances; and collectivization of agriculture that extended the system into the countryside and universalized guarantees.
There were intra-regional variations, of course, but the convergence of Central and East European state-socialist welfare systems was much greater than that of welfare systems in Latin America. In his presentation, Haggard presented data on government spending in the last two decades of the twentieth-century to demonstrate the enduring effects of welfare legacies on contemporary social policy. Reflecting the state-socialist legacy, social security spending from 1980 through 2000 in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia represented about 13 to 14 percent of GDP. By comparison, in Latin America social security spending represented only between 6 and 9 percent of GDP, while in East and Southeast Asia it represented merely about 1 percent of GDP.
Health spending follows the same pattern as social security spending. Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia spend about 4 percent of GDP on health while Latin America spends a lower percentage, and East and Southeast Asia even less. Education spending, however, follows a different pattern. East and Southeast Asian countries spend on the order of 4 to 4.5 percent of GDP on education, whereas Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Latin America exhibit much lower rates.
Haggard and Kauffman demonstrated that the effects of democracy on social policy are clearly conditioned by the distribution and organization of interests. They highlighted the importance of historical legacies, drawing attention to the constraints that these place on countries in terms of the social policies they can pursue.
Central and Eastern Europe
In their paper, Professors Béla Greskovits and Dorothee Bohle asked what remedies for poverty and inequality have been adopted by Central and East European states and to what degree they have been successful. Greskovits and Bohle explored the strategic differences between the model adopted by the Visegrád group (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic) plus Slovenia and the model followed by the Baltic group (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia), despite the common features of their transition from communist rule. The authors also examined how these postcommunist states integrated themselves into the global economy. Both groups of countries exited their previous economic system through a process of export-oriented development that was very successful in attracting foreign investment. Their economic policies, generally speaking, were biased in favor of international corporations and tended to neglect
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Violetta Zentai and Béla Greskovits listen to Alina Mungiu-Pippidi's comments following Greskovits' s presentation. small and medium-sized domestic enterprises. "Jobless growth" was a function of the private sector's limited employment capacity, and depressed wages were insufficient for survival in some sectors.
The Visegrád-4 and Slovenia reindustrialized along the lines of what might be called "core-like" specializations, emphasizing such sophisticated products as cars, electronics, machinery, and chemicals. This reindustrialization created a dualism between the transnational corporations' workers, who live in the more developed regions, and workers in more traditional sectors of the economy. In contrast, the Baltic States, as well as Bulgaria and Romania, followed a more "semi-peripheral" path of reform involving de-industrialization, de-skilling, and the development of less advanced specializations (food, wood, footwear, textiles, electronic assembly, etc.). These semi-peripheral sectors tend to produce lower wages, a function of the low-cost, union-free sweatshops run by the highly mobile transnational corporations that proliferated following the fall of Soviet enterprise. The costs of this precarious transnationalization were paid by the sweatshops' working poor. The two different models of welfare capitalism adopted by the Visegrád and the Baltic countries are reflected in differences in the relative size and volume of social benefits, public-sector employment, and education spending, as well as in the treatment of minority ethnic groups.
Social spending (excluding education) in the Baltic countries averaged between 12 and 13 percent of GDP, whereas the Visegrád-4 plus Slovenia spent much more, 19 to 23 percent-though this amount is still below that of the EU-15 countries. In terms of the cost of social benefits per person between 2004 and 2006, the Baltic States spent approximately €1,500. The Visegrád-4 countries spent a significantly greater amount, €2,661, while Slovenia, a more economically advanced country, spent €4,470. Spending per person in the EU-15 is approximately €6,700. As for public-sector employment, one can observe a much higher level in the Baltic-3 than the Visegrád-4. Additionally, in the Baltic States, the at-risk-of-poverty rate after social transfers is 20 percent, while only 14 percent of the population in the Visegrád-4 countries is at risk, and only 12 percent in Slovenia-rates much better than the 16 percent in the EU-15.
Poverty and inequality in Central and Eastern Europe have a strong ethnic dimension. In Estonia and Latvia, many of the working poor are ethnic Russians. Similarly, in the Visegrád-4 countries, a considerable segment of the long-term unemployed are ethnic Roma. The high number of unemployed minorities carries significant political implications since it is particularly difficult to build redistribution coalitions on the basis of sectors that are considered foreign by the majority of the population. The ethnic dimension of poverty further compounds its alienating effect.
The question of why the Baltic and Visegrád models are so different is intriguing given that both groups of states inherited similar industrial and welfare legacies and had similar transformative visions built on "returning to the West." The answer, according to Greskovits and Bohle, is that popular consent for policy and social legitimacy was sought via different sorts of appeals. In the case of the Visegrád countries, consent was sought on the basis of a welfarist modelassuring the population that its socioeconomic welfare would be taken care of. In the Baltic States, by contrast, the basis of legitimacy was more nationalist. The new social contracts in the Baltic States, which had been Soviet colonies, emphasized the recovery of national independence rather than the welfarist promises that were central in the Visegrád-4.
Turkey
Later at the conference, Öykü Uluçay discussed the case of Turkey. Turkey has one of the highest levels of poverty among OECD countries, but by the standards of most developing countries its level of poverty is very low, affecting only 12 to 13 percent of the population. A looser definition of poverty yields a rate of 31 percent, but pensions and social transfers reduce it to 25 percent. This is a very modest result when compared to the performance of the EU-15, where pensions and transfers reduce the level of poverty by 15
The question of why the Baltic and Visegrád models are so different is intriguing given that both groups had similar transformative visions built on "returning to the West." percentage points. Turkey has a very complex welfare system grounded not only in state services, but also in social structures independent of the state. Alongside the state system, Turkey has a traditional welfare regime-a safety net that is based more on societal than government-provided services, and includes the diversification of economic activities within extended families, urban-rural linkages, informal housing, and extended networks of kinship.
East and South Asia
Professor Jaeyeol Yee gave a presentation on East Asia, emphasizing the cases of Korea and Taiwan. With Gini indexes of .24 and .34, respectively, Taiwan and Korea have extremely low coefficients of inequality compared to countries such as Argentina (.51), Bolivia (.68), Brazil (.59), Botswana (.63), and Zambia (.53 ). Yet the amount of social spending in Korea and Taiwan is also low, an apparent contradiction that needs further exploration.
Things may be changing in East Asia, however, where the Gini index has been increasing since 1992. Yee averred that inequality is deepening in both Korea and Taiwan, especially in the former. Between 1991 and 2006, the ranks of the middle classes decreased by 13 percent while the low-income and highincome classes increased by 7 and 5 percent, respectively. Moreover, in 1996, 41 percent of Koreans perceived themselves as being middle class, whereas now that percentage is only 28 percent.
With respect to India, Partha Mokhopadhyay traced the evolution from the anti-poverty policies started by Indira Gandhi in the mid-1970s to the more universal policies of the present. Suhas Palshikar pointed out in his remarks that politics in India is becoming less focused on identity issues and more on public welfare.
Latin America
Alberto Díaz-Cayeros presented a paper (coauthored with Beatriz Magaloni) that focused on the panoply of targeted programs known as conditional cash transfers (CCTs), which have been quite successful in reducing poverty in Latin America. In Brazil, for example, more than 11 million people benefit from the Bolsa Familia program. In Colom-bia, about 5 percent of the population benefit from similar targeted programs. In Mexico, there are 5 million families-about 25 million people-who benefit from such programs. In Peru, there are some 230,000 families-about 1 million people. The prevailing way of addressing poverty in Latin America has been not to reform the overall welfare system, but to develop specific anti-poverty policies. Poverty in Latin America has dropped significantly over the past five years (although not exclusively due to these programs), from about 42 percent to about 36 percent. The effect of the current economic crisis remains to be seen. Significantly, centrist governments were the first to begin to apply these kinds of programs. Rightist governments followed suit, while leftist governments adopted these policies much later.
Africa
Professor Larry Diamond gave a presentation on the case of Africa. Inspired by Peter Lewis's "Growth Without Prosperity in Africa," which appeared in the October 2008 issue of the Journal of Democracy, Diamond noted that African states have the highest percentages of poverty, with about 51 percent of Africans living below the poverty line. Africa also has the greatest levels of economic inequality: The richest quintile of the population captures 65 percent of the national income while the lowest quintile shares in only a very small percentage of the wealth. As Diamond commented, if CCT programs were to be applied in Africa, they would have to cover the overwhelming majority of the population.
Larry Diamond presents on poverty and inequality in Africa.
Diamond pointed out that African states are unique in terms of governance as well. In most of the cases the conference addressed, the presumption is that the state acts with a desire to advance the collective public good, but such an understanding does not exist in many African states where primordial structures hinder effective governance based on universalist concerns. Instead, the norm too often is pursuit of particularistic concerns within hierarchical sociopolitical structures. Suggesting that effective policies must move the concerns of African states from the particular to the universal, Diamond criticized foreign aid schemes that pay insufficient attention to governance and accountability.
Common Threads and Concerns
The discussions at the conference manifested a number of common threads and concerns. One was the impact of historical legacies, in regard to which two distinct patterns can be discerned. In the first, as exemplified by the cases of East Asia and of Central and Eastern Europe, new democracies came into being with lower levels of poverty and lesser degrees of inequality. In the case of Central and Eastern Europe, these were the legacy of the former communist regimes. In East Asia, they were a product of post-World War II reform, especially land redistribution. The second pattern, as manifest in the cases of Latin America and Africa, is characterized by high levels of poverty and inequality, the lingering legacies of colonialism and oligarchic rule. (Uruguay and Costa Rica, two Latin American countries with highly developed welfare systems, are the exception.) Another common thread uniting these different regional experiences is the structure of constraints that limited the choices available to governments. These limitations in choice are also a function of countries' historical legacies. Countries with high levels of poverty, such as those in Latin America, tended to prioritize targeted policies, while other countries focused on reforming or strengthening the overall welfare system. Such policy decisions are determined by the constraints under which policymakers operate.
A third common thread is the matrix of consequences resulting from market policies. Although these policies helped achieve macroeconomic stability and opened up economies, they also had unintended consequences, often weakening already frail welfare systems. In Latin America, two paths opened as a result of government policies toward poverty. Countries reluctant to address poverty fell prey to populist authoritarian forces (Venezuela, Nicaragua, Ecuador, and to some extent, Bolivia), while governments that addressed these issues successfully have been able to build more stable democracies (Brazil, Mexico, and Chile) .
In South and Southeast Asia, governments that have addressed the challenges of poverty have fared well. The popularity of Thailand's ousted prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra can in part be attributed to his anti-poverty policies and introduction of a universal healthcare system. As Nancy Bermeo noted in her paper, Thailand has exhibited an exceptional record of reducing inequality. In India, the recent electoral success of the Congress Party can also be partly attributed to its effective antipoverty policy. India is a success story not only in terms of democracy, but also in terms of reducing poverty from 50-to-55 percent to current levels of about 20-to-25 percent. This success is a function of the implementation of a consistent, sustained, and effective anti-poverty policy that has been in place since the 1970s, as well as of the tremendous economic growth India has experienced in the past 10 to 15 years. Central and Eastern Europe has experienced a similar success story, though today the Visegrád countries seem to be handling the economic crisis better than the Baltic States. In Turkey, the continued success of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) can in part be attributed to its social welfare policies.
Conclusions
High levels of poverty and inequality not only lower the quality of democracy, but may pave the way for the emergence of authoritarian populists and democratic backsliding. Therefore, addressing the social question, which warrants attention in its own right, is critical to the sustainability and quality of democracy. There are different ways to confront the challenge of poverty and inequality, depending on historical legacies, the structure of constraints, and the impact of previous economic policies. There is no single recipe, yet the comparative analysis presented at the Bratislava conference, and the four conference papers that will appear in the October 2009 Journal of Democracy, shed considerable light upon the advantages and drawbacks of these different approaches.
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